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"Deliberative democratic theorists maintain that if citizens reach more
reflective political judgments, they will directly and indirectly lead the polity
toward better public policy decisions."
-Gastil
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"When

...

[deliberating] ...

Americans will be not encountering one

another as consumers or coreligionists or even friends-but as citizens
searching for common ground. .. in a common enterprise."
-Ackerman

and Fishkin

2

"Ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus-to
find reasons that are persuasive to all ...
-Cohen

3

"[D]eliberation allows people to discover latent public values that they have
in common with others, and in the process to create new public values.
Together, citizens begin to ... identify what they value most about the
community, and to uncover goals and commitments that transcend their
narrower self-interests."
-Reich

4

I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, legal scholars, social scientists, political theorists, and
others have extolled the virtues of deliberation, arguing that we should
incorporate more deliberative practices into our political institutions. To
that end, scholars have argued that our electoral processes should be
made more deliberative (perhaps through the use of deliberative polling),5
while others recommend that deliberation processes be augmented in
legislatures, 6 courts,7 and agencies. 8 Deliberation is proposed as a major

2.
Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day, in DEBATING
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 7, 22 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003).
3.
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 72 (James Bohman & William Rehg
eds., 1997).

4.

Robert

B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An

InterpretiveEssay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1636 (1985) (emphasis in original).
5.
See generally Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 2.
6.
See generally JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994); ESTEEMED COLLEAGUES:
CIVILITY AND DELIBERATION IN THE U.S. SENATE (Burdett A. Loomis ed., 2000); BILL
GRANSTAFF, LOSING OUR DEMOCRATIC SPIRIT: CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION AND THE

DICTATORSHIP OF PROPAGANDA (1999); GARY MUCCIARONI & PAUL J. QUIRK,
DELIBERATIVE CHOICES: DEBATING PUBLIC POLICY IN CONGRESS (2006); DAVID
WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN CONGRESS: MEMBERS, STAFF, AND THE SEARCH FOR

INFORMATION (1995).
7.
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1994).
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palliative and, for some, even a panacea for nearly all that is wrong in
society-a procedural "cure all" for self-interested decisionmaking,9 for
an uninformed citizenry,' ° for the oppression of minorities," for social
13
fragmentation, 2 and for low levels of confidence in our government,
among other ills.
In all of this frenzy to cure societal ills through deliberation, however,
scholars have either explicitly or implicitly assumed their own
conclusion: that deliberation has social welfare-enhancing effects. The
social welfare enhancement claim for deliberation is that increasing
deliberation will lead to better decisionmaking, where "better" is defined
as improving social welfare.
From a cognitive science perspective, the conclusion that deliberation
improves social welfare is peculiar. Indeed, much of the cognitive science
literature causes us to question not only the welfare-improving effects of
deliberation, but also the core assumptions upon which theories of
deliberation rest.' 4 Specifically, scholars who advocate deliberation assume
that the participants will speak to each other, listen to each other, respect
each other, and then learn from one another's statements. As the
cognitive science literature reminds us, however, speaking, listening, and
learning are all costly behaviors; that is, when we speak or listen to one

8.
See Mariano-Florentino Cullar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN.
L. REv. 411,415-18 (2005).
9.
See generally Cohen, supra note 3, at 67-92; Jurgen Habermas, Three
Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 21 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
See generally JAMES S. FISHKrN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW
10.
DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,

DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 100-01 (1996); James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin,

The DeliberativePoll: A Reply to Our Critics, 7 PUB. PERSP. 45 (1996); Gastil & Dillard,
supra note 1; Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL.
THEORY 338 (1987).

11.

Philip Pettit, Democracy, Electoral and Contestatory, in NOMOS XLII:

DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 105 (lan Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
12. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 73; Cohen, supra note 3, at 67-92.
13.
See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, Thin Democracy: Politics as Zookeeping,
in STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 3 (1984); Ackerman

& Fishkin, supra note 2; Cohen, supra note 3, at 67-92; John S. Dryzek, Legitimacy and
Economy in Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. THEORY 651 (2001); Manin, supra note 10.
14.
For a discussion, see Arthur Lupia, DeliberationDisconnected: What it Takes
to Improve Civic Competence, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2002).

person, we must forego the opportunity to do something else.' 5 Further,
because humans have limited energy, they are able to pay attention to
and remember only a small fraction of the information available to
them. 16 What these cognitive limitations imply for successful deliberation
is this: Whatever the relationship between idealized theories of
deliberation and social welfare, deliberation in practice is unlikely to
improve social welfare because it is improbable that groups of people
will be willing to speak, listen, and learn from one another.
The positive and normative literatures on deliberation are vast and
complex, and this Article, despite its promisingly ambitious title, has a
limited objective. In light of the epistemic claim on behalf of improving
deliberation, we consider some results from modem game theory and
our own laboratory experiments that bear on the questions of whether
and in what circumstances individuals deliberate and when this
deliberation inomatus-a-um improves social welfare.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss the concept
of deliberation in the contemporary literature on the subject. While
democratic and legal theorists grapple with the conundrum of what
deliberation means in theory and in practice, we discuss briefly where
these views on deliberation converge in the scholarly discussion. After
describing the core features of deliberation as a welfare-enhancing
enterprise, we next discuss the relevance and structure of our experiments,
describing how our experiments are closely analogous to modem models
of deliberation. We then present the results of our experiments, results
which indicate that deliberation, even when attempted under ideal
conditions, does not improve social welfare, and, in all but rare
circumstances, may decrease it.
While of the focus of this Article is on deliberation as a palliative to
decisionmaking, we conclude with a brief, preliminary discussion of an
important non-deliberative decisionmaking device, that is, so-called
expertise systems (which we define as settings in which at least one
participant has knowledge about a particular topic, and the other
participants have opportunities to learn from that knowledgeable
participant's statements). We show how such systems can, by contrast
to the deliberation model, consistently lead to large improvements in
social welfare. We conclude with a discussion of the (im)possibility of
deliberative democracy.
15.

ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN

CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 22 (1998); Lupia, supra note 14.
16.
See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBNS, supra note 15, at 17-38; DANIEL L.
SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS

(2001); Arthur Lupia, The Wrong Tack, 3 LEGAL AFF. 43, 43-45 (2004).
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II. UNPACKING DELIBERATION
The case for deliberation comprises two distinctive strands of argument.
The first strand focuses on the intrinsic values associated with citizen
discussion over policy ends and means in deliberative settings. It is fair
to describe this school of thought as the most coherently articulated
position in the scholarship on deliberation. It is a view for which a
wide range of democratic theorists, including Joshua Cohen, 7 Jurgen
2
20
9
and Philip Petit, '
Habermas, 1 8 John Dryzek," James Fishkin,

among others, 22 argue. And it is a view that has become important to
prominent academic lawyers, including Bruce Ackerman, 23 Ronald
Dworkin, 24 Frank27 Michelman,25 Cass Sunstein,2 6 and MarianoFlorentino Cuellar.
In this account, deliberation is tied squarely to democracy and
constitutional self-government; that is, the values and virtues of
deliberative democracy as an ideal are thought to enhance democracy by
encouraging and incentivizing citizens to participate in organized ways
in discursive politics and policymaking. As Joshua Cohen puts it:
[T]he deliberative conception offers a more forceful rendering than aggregative
conceptions of the fundamental democratic idea-the idea that decisions about the
exercise of state power are collective. It requires that we offer considerations

17. Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 222
(Jon Elster ed., 1998).
18.
JORGEN HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
19. JoHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS,
CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS (2000).
20. FISHK1N, supra note 10.
21. Petit, supra note 11.
22.
See generally JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY,
AND DEMOCRACY (1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY? (2004); ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004); Cohen, supra note 17;
Gastil & Dillard, supra note 1; Robert E. Goodin, DemocraticDeliberation Within, 29
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 81 (2000); Manin, supra note 13; Reich, supra note 4.
23.
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
24. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
25.
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, Forward: Traces of Self
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
26. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
27. See generally Cudllar, supra note 8, at 411-14.

acceptable to others, understood to be free,
equal, and reasonable, and whose
28
conduct will be governed by the decisions.

Significantly, this account celebrates deliberation separate from the
prospect that arrived-at decisions will be "better" from the vantage point
of any objective rendering of social welfare.
The second strand of the case for deliberation-less formed, but
nonetheless conspicuous-is the argument that deliberation enhances
social welfare. The claim made here is that deliberation leads to better
decisions, where better is defined as enhancing social welfare. John
Ferejohn usefully labels this view "epistemic," in that it sees deliberation
as a process "which aims to find the best course of public action." 29
Because our focus here is on this second claim-the claim that
deliberation enhances social welfare-we need to clarify what exactly
these advocates of the deliberative model mean by deliberation. Adam
Przeworski notes that, at the very least, deliberative decisionmaking
"is a form of discussion intended to change the preferences on the
bases of which people decide to act."3 To be sure, this may be a
stricter condition-what we might call the endogenous preferences
condition-than many advocates for deliberation would want to accept.
For those who regard the speech situation in deliberative settings (one
thinks most conspicuously here of Habermas) as intrinsically valuable,
then preferences need not necessarily be reshaped in the discussion
setting. Indeed, for Habermas, 3 it is the achievement of consensus or
agreement that is the goal of deliberation, not necessarily influencing
others. Yet, the connection between deliberation as a process by which
minds are changed (and thus decisions come out differently than they
would in the absence of deliberation) and the enhancement of social
welfare is rather clear: quite simply, deliberation matters insofar as
individuals come into this setting with both a willingness and the means
to communicate, advocate, and ultimately to become persuaded with
others and by others.
There are a number of additional conditions that, while prominent in
the literature, are not part of our focus in this Article. We nonetheless
pause to consider them briefly, since a comprehensive case for or against
deliberation as social welfare enhancing would have to take them into
Cohen, supra note 17.
28.
29.
John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in NoMos XLII:
DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 11, at 75, 82.
30.
Adam Przeworski, DeliberationandIdeological Domination, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 140-60.
31.
See generally Kenneth Baynes, Habermas, Jurgen, in 4 ROUTLEDGE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

193 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
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account. The first is described most eloquently by Joshua Cohen. He
notes that, in deliberative settings, participants must "regard one another
as equals; they aim to defend and criticize institutions and programs in
terms of considerations that others have reason to accept, given ... that
those others are reasonable; and they are prepared to cooperate in
accordance with the results of such discussion ... ."32 Or as Amy Guttman
and Dennis Thompson put it, deliberation must "aspire to a kind of
political reasoning that is mutually justifiable. 3 3
This expectation of public reasoning and the advancement of the
common good echoes, of course, John Rawls' stylized discussion setting; it
also resonates with Habermas's notion of the ideal speech situation. As
noted by Habermas, the very structure and process of communicative
action that he proposes "grounds the presumption that reasonable or fair
results are obtained. ' 34 According to Habermas's principles of discourse
ethics, his model of deliberative democracy is valid if and only if the
public is capable of making (and willing to make) political decisions that
advance the common good.3 5
Second, and more pertinent for our argument here, is what John
36
Ferejohn describes as institutional requisites for epistemic deliberation.
While not advocating deliberation as a social choice process, Ferejohn
shrewdly unpacks the institutional conditions for deliberation, where
deliberation aims to improve the quality of decision-making in group
settings. Ferejohn first describes the imperative of having adequate
enforcement institutions, that is, institutions require that "public decisions
can be seen as jointly made" and thus individuals in these settings will
accord proper legitimacy to outcomes, regardless of whether and to what
extent they actually participated in the discursive process.37 Next, given
the ubiquitous problems of coordination and collective action, it is
crucial that a process be defined ex ante that makes clear "just what is
required of each individual in order to implement the decision. 38
Implementation, Ferejohn reminds us, is critical; and the enhancement of

32.
Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 9, at 95, 100.
33.
GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 53.
34.
See Baynes, supra note 31.
35.
Matthew Weinshall, Means, Ends andPublicIgnorance in Habermas's Theory
of Democracy, 15 CRITICAL REV. 29 (2003).
36.
See generally Ferejohn, supra note 29.
37.
Id. at 88-90.

38.

Id. at 89.

social welfare requires not merely agreement at the end of the deliberation
setting, but, as well, agreement about what comes next and how these
reasoning individuals will play their respective parts. Third, "public
decisions are typically made at a level of generality that requires
interpretation before the decision can be applied to particular cases;" that
is, they "have an irreducibly creative aspect" that may be unanticipated
at the time the decision is made.39 An institutional framework is
important to settle disputes that may arise ex post about the meaning to
be accorded to these group decisions.
In addition to these enforcement decisions, Ferejohn emphasizes that
decisionmaking and deliberative institutions are also essential for
reasoning citizens to create before entering into deliberative processes.4 °
The nature and configuration of these institutions-or, more fundamentally,
the insight that these institutions are essential elements in the
deliberative model-are of interest to us in our empirical evaluation of
deliberation, for these processes bear on the likelihood that the
communicative process can properly take place given the structure of
incentives and the costs of deliberating. As we explain below, one of the
requisites of deliberation in all extant theories of that enterprise is the
ability to communicate freely with one another. Introducing, then, a
mechanism such as, say, a secret ballot confounds this free communication
condition.4 Other institutional mechanisms may have this quality as
well. The point we stress here is that the main conditions for deliberation as
described by political theorists must be, for the reasons Ferejohn and
others emphasize, augmented by attention to institutions and the basic
insight from economics, that is, the condition of scarcity.
III. DELIBERATION IN A REALISTIC SETTING
A. Experimenting with Deliberation
The social-welfare argument for deliberation rests on a stylized
version of deliberation, one in which individuals are configured into a
group setting and are given instructions about what issues are before
them for discussion and resolution. As already discussed, the conditions
for this deliberation are elaborate. The key condition that we focus on in
our experiment is communication and, more specifically, the ability and
willingness of similarly incentivized individuals to speak, listen, and

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 90-96.

41.

See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Straw Polls, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 791,

798 (2002).
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learn in group settings where such activities would improve decisionmaking outcomes (that is, improve social welfare).4 2
The experiment described in what follows is configured to represent a
simple setting in which discussion among equally motivated individuals
would unquestionably enhance both individual and social welfare. Thus,
the experiment's design and, further, the experimental results described
herein, are close analogies to scholars' theories of deliberation. Specifically,
they incorporate the costs associated with speaking and listening in a
collective setting. To preview our ultimate conclusion, our experiments
demonstrate that when speaking and listening are costly, deliberation
does not improve social welfare, but rather, decreases it. Given this
surprising result, we then investigate whether deliberation has different
42. There is now a large literature devoted to analyzing group decisionmaking,
much of which we build upon in this study. Indeed, in addition to several other studies
of deliberation, see generally Eric S. Dickson, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa
Cognition and Strategy: A Deliberation Experiment (NYU Working Paper, 2005),
available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/landa/ExperimentPaper.pdf;
Adam Meirowitz, In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting
with Private Beliefs and Values (Yale Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.
yale.edu/leitner/delibjtpn.pdf: John Patty, Arguments-Based Collective Choice,
(Working Paper, 2005), availableat http://www.peoplefair.harvard.edu-web.pdf. There also
exist common pool resource experiments, which assess levels of cooperation in group
settings.

See generally ELINOR OSTROM, RoY GARDNER & JAMES WALKER, RULES,

GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994); Peter Kollock, Transforming Social
Dilemmas: Group Identity and Co-operation, in MODELING RATIONALITY, MORALITY, AND
EVOLUTION 185 (Peter A. Danielson ed., 1998); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the
Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (2000); Bradley J. Ruffle & Richard
Sosis, Cooperation and the In-Group-Out-GroupBias: A Field Test on Israeli Kibbutz
Members and City Residents, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 147 (2006); David Sally,
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments
from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & Soc'y 58 (1995) [hereinafter Sally, Conversation
and Cooperation];David Sally, On Sympathy and Games, 44 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1
(2001) [hereinafter Sally, On Sympathy]. In these common pool resource experiments,
scholars are typically interested in individuals' willingness to cooperate or contribute to
the common good, and they often find that subjects are more willing to cooperate if there
exists some form of group identity among the members. See Kollock, supra; Ruffle &
Sosis, supra. Such group identities are typically formed when subjects share similar
backgrounds, memberships in clubs, clans, or groups, or have some other core feature in
common. In the deliberative settings that many scholars advocate, however, there is
little or no opportunity to develop such group identities, as hundreds of citizens from
many different backgrounds, religions, etc. will be brought together to deliberate for a
short amount of time. For this reason, we do not take steps to foster a group identity in
our experiments, aside from offering subjects a $10 bonus if they all coordinate on the
correct answer to the math problem.

effects on social welfare in small versus large groups.

Our results

demonstrate that even in groups as small as four people, deliberation
does not improve social welfare. Further, when the number of individuals
in a group increases to eight, nine, ten, twelve, or fifteen participants,
then deliberation again brings about significant declines in social
welfare, with larger groups suffering larger declines.
Of course, the results of this experiment do not offer the ultimate
rebuttal to social welfare claims for deliberation, whether in its idealized
version or in more realistic rubrics. Yet, we offer this simple experiment
and the remarkable results yielded as a challenge to those who argue for
deliberation on social welfare grounds. The issue is not only one of
political theory. Rather, arguments for deliberation in decisionmaking
settings compete with other models of social choice, including so-called
aggregative (i.e., voting) models and, as we discuss briefly in our
conclusion, expertise models of collective decisionmaking.
B. The Structure of Our Experiments
We designed our laboratory experiments with two goals in mind.
First, we wanted our experiments to be close analogies to scholars'
models of deliberation. Second, we sought to maintain a controlled
environment that would allow us to make internally valid inferences.
However, because the literature has yet to converge upon a single model
of deliberation,43 and because it is difficult to conduct a controlled
experiment while allowing subjects to communicate with one another,
we were forced to focus on one particular type of deliberation in our
experiments. In what follows, we describe the basic structure of our

43.
See, e.g., DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH & TIMOTHY J. FEDDERSEN, DELIBERATION,
PREFERENCE UNCERTAINTY AND VOTING RULES (2005); CATHERINE HAFER & DIMITRI
LANDA, DELIBERATION, IDEOLOGICAL BIAS, AND GROUP CHOICE (2005) [hereinafter
HAFER & LANDA, IDEOLOGICAL BIAS]; Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,

supra note 3, at 67-92; Dickson, et. al., supra note 42; Meirowitz, supra note 42; Patty,
supra note 42; Randall Calvert & James Johnson, Rational Actors, Political Argument,
and Democratic Deliberation(Am. Pol. Sci. Assoc. Working Paper, 1998), available at

http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/calvert/downloads/arguments.vl2.pdf; Dino Gerardi &
Leeat Yariv, Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice
With Communication (UCLA Working Paper No. 27, 2002), available at http://www.
econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp827.pdf, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Deliberationas
Self-Discovery and Institutionsfor Political Speech, J. THEORETICAL POL. (forthcoming
2006); available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/landa/Deliberation.pdf;

Barton L. Lipman & Duane J. Seppi, Robust Inference in Communication Games with
PartialProvability,66 J. ECON. THEORY 370 (1995).
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experiments, 4 noting throughout how various aspects of our experimental
design correspond to key features of scholars' models of deliberation. 5
In our experiments, subjects 46 are asked to deliberate about the

answers to math problems about which they are uncertain (that is,
subjects do not necessarily know the correct answers to the math
problems). 47 These math problems are drawn from an SAT II, level two
math test, and subjects are asked to make a series of binary choices
about them: first, subjects may choose to answer a problem or leave it
blank; second, if they decide to answer a problem, then they may choose

44.
The protocols and handouts used in these experiments, as well as the results,
are available from the authors.
45.
See Table 1 for a complete listing of the links between our experiments and
scholars' theories of deliberation.
46.
Note that our subjects are college undergraduates who are over the age of 18
and who are enrolled in classes at the University of California, San Diego. When
recruiting these subjects, we posted flyers at various locations on campus (for example,
in front of the library, in the cafeterias, in the dormitories, and in academic buildings),
and we also sent out campus-wide emails to advertise the experiments.
47.
That subjects do not necessarily know the correct answers to the math
problems ensures that our experiments capture a key feature of deliberation-namely,
the ability of participants to change their minds or to correct their beliefs about the right
answer to the question. Indeed, Ian Shapiro underscores the importance of flexible
preferences for successful deliberation when he states:
Typically, the motivating thought [among scholars of deliberation] is that
people do not always have unalterable, or even well-formed, desires, so that
understanding what others want, and why, can lead to adaptation of preferences in
mutually compatible ways. The assumption is that if people talk for long enough
in the right circumstances they will eventually be brought to agree, and that this is
a good thing.
Ian Shapiro, Optional Deliberation?, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra
note 2, at 123.

TABLE 1. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THEORIES OF DELIBERATION
AND OUR EXPERIMENTS

Theoretical Condition

Examples of the Theoretical
Condition
48

Common Interests

Ackerman & Fishkin

Reasoning

Ackerman and Fishkin;
Cohen & Fung; 50
52
.51
Sanders; Ackerman

Consensus/Unanimity

Cohen;
Manin54

Equality

49

53

Cohen;

55

Cohen &
56

Fung

48.
49.
50.

Experimental Condition

Earning a $10 bonus if
everyone answers a problem
correctly.
In one version of our
experiments, subjects
exchange reasons (proofs) for
choosing answer "a" or
answer "b".
Common interests with
significant incentives to reach
a unanimous decision: If even
one subject gets the problem
wrong or leaves it blank then
all subjects miss out on the
$10 bonus.
Subjects' personal
characteristics (i.e., gender,
race, appearance, voice, etc.)
are in no way linked to the
statements that they make;
therefore, all subjects'
statements are treated equally.

Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 2.
Id.
Joshua Cohen & Archon Fung, Radical Democracy, 10 Swiss J. POLL. SCI. 23

(2004), availableat http://www.archonfung.net/ papers/CohenFung_Debate SPSR2004.pdf
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation,25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997).
Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 2.
Cohen, supra note 3.
Martin, supra note 10.
Cohen, supra note 3.
Cohen & Fung, supra note 50.
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Uptake & Engagement of
Information

Goodin 5 7

After receiving information,
subjects have 60 seconds to
choose their final answer.

Minds are Changed

Shapiro 58

Subjects may change their
answers.

Opportunities to Exchange
Accurate Information

Ackerman & Fishkin 5 9

Subjects may send and
receive the correct answers to
the math problems.

Choosingfrom a Menu of
Solutions

Knight & Johnson 6 0

Subjects may select anser "a"
or answer "b".

Reduced Density of
Information

Goodin 6 1

Subjects send and receive
signals in the form of answer
"a"or answer "b".

Minds are Changed

Shapiro62

Subjects may change their
answers.

either answer "a" or answer "b" as the correct answer.6 3 Subjects have
60 seconds to answer each math problem, and they earn $1 for every
problem that they answer correctly, they lose $1 for every problem that
they answer incorrectly, and they neither earn nor lose money if they
choose not to answer the problem. In later trials, subjects are also told
57.

Robert E. Goodin, Democratic Deliberation Within, in DEBATING DELBERATIVE

DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 54.

58.
Shapiro, supra note 47.
59. Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 2.
60. Jack Knight & James Johnson, Aggregation and Deliberation: On the
Possibilityof DemocraticLegitimacy, 22 POL. THEORY 277 (1994).
61.
Goodin, supra note 57.
62.
Shapiro, supra note 47.
63.
Note that this aspect of our experiment captures two key features of scholars'
models of deliberation: 1) having participants choose from a menu of solutions and 2)
reducing the density of information. For example, Knight and Johnson emphasize that
choosing from a menu of options is a key element of deliberation when they state:
"[Deliberation] is not merely conversation. Contrary to the views of some of its
advocates, argument and debate, in our view, constitute precisely and non-pejoratively 'a
deliberative preliminary to the act of choosing' from among solutions to contested
political problems." Knight & Johnson, supra note 60, at 286 (emphasis omitted). As
for reduced density of information, this aspect of deliberation is captured in Goodin's
notion of "emaciated deliberation." Goodin, supra note 57, at 59. Specifically, he notes
that '[E]maciated deliberation' . . . facilitates mass deliberation by reducing the density of
the signals and hence the deliberative load each participant has to bear." Id.

that they make an additional $10 each if they all choose the correct
answer to a math problem' (i.e., if even one subject gets a problem
wrong or leaves it blank, then they all miss out on the $10 bonus), which
establishes strong common interests among them.65 Indeed, the experiment
is purposefully structured to encourage the subjects to reach consensus,
which is one of the goals that Habermas and many others have attributed
to deliberation. 66 For example, Habermas emphasizes that "[t]he goal or
'telos' of communicative action is not expressed or realized in an
attempt to influence others, but in the attempt to reach an agreement
or
mutual understanding (Verstandigung) about something in the world., 67
In addition to large incentives for unanimous decisions, the existence
of a single correct answer reduces the likelihood of intra-group conflict.
These two conditions then establish the ideal conditions for deliberation
to work; that is, every subject's interests are aligned. We consider
successful deliberation to have occurred when all subjects choose the
correct answer to a math problem.

64.
Note that we do not reward subjects for coordinating on the wrong answer to a
math problem, as this seems to be at odds with the core objective of deliberation. Stated
differently, scholars do not advocate deliberation (and emphasize the importance of
reaching a consensus) because they want citizens to arrive at the wrong policy choices,
but rather because they want them to choose the "correct" or social welfare-enhancing
policy. Further, rewarding subjects for coordinating on both the correct and incorrect
answers makes our simple communication game between the senders and receivers much
more difficult to solve.
65.
Common interests among participants is a core feature of many models of
deliberation. As Ackerman and Fishkin note: "When ... [deliberating] ...Americans

will be not encountering one another as consumers or coreligionists or even friends-but
as citizens searching for common ground, engaged in the great task of reconstructing a
thin but precious civic bond that ties us all together in a common enterprise." Ackerman
& Fishkin, supranote 2, at 22.
66.
Defining successful deliberation as the unanimous agreement individuals in a
group is common in the deliberation literature. For example, Manin emphasizes that
"[t]he principal arguments that have been proposed seek, in effect, to define social rules
capable of bringing about the unanimous agreement of individuals." Manin, supra note
10, at 338. Similarly, Cohen contends that "ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a
rationally motivated consensus- to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are
committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives
by equals." Cohen, supra note 3, at 75. Although previous models and empirical
tests of deliberation have modeled deliberation as majority decision-making, this choice
does not seem to capture what deliberative theorists have in mind. In fact, if all
deliberative theorists propose is majority decision-making with subject-area experts then
many of our current political institutions (i.e., Congress, elections, Court system) should
already be considered deliberative. Because we do not believe this is what deliberation's
advocates have in mind we model the decision rule as unanimity.
67. See Baynes, supra note 31, at 145.

[Vol. 15: 9, 2006]

Does DeliberatingImprove Decisionmaking?
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

In various treatment settings, which we describe below, we allow the
subjects to deliberate, and therefore, the conditions of the deliberation
form the various treatments applied. Specifically, we allow subjects to
exchange information about the math problem on which they are
working,6" and because we require all subjects to sit behind partitions
and to communicate via sheets of paper, we ensure that everyone's
statements are treated equally. 69 Indeed, throughout our experiments (and
as in idealized models of deliberation), subjects' personal characteristics
(i.e., their gender, race, appearance, voice, etc.) are in no way linked to
the statements that they make and, therefore, cannot influence the weight
that their statements are given.
So, when solving each math problem in the experiment, each subject
has the chance to make an anonymous statement to the other subjects
(i.e., send a signal about whether they recommend answer "a" or answer
"b" as the correct answer to a math problem), and each subject can also
choose to listen to an aggregation of the signals that the other subjects
sent.7" This aggregation of signals consists of information about the
total number of subjects in the room, the number of subjects who chose
to recommend answer "a," and the number of subjects who chose to
recommend answer "b." After deciding whether to send a recommended
answer to the other subjects and after deciding whether to receive

68.
Note that this satisfies the requirement that participants in deliberation have
opportunities to exchange accurate information. Indeed, Ackerman and Fishkin

emphasize that: "[Deliberation requires] that there be opportunities for reasonably
accurate information to enter the dialogue. Some reasonable level of completeness and
of accuracy is required for deliberative discussion to take place." Ackerman & Fishkin,
supra note 2, at 27.
69.
It has been suggested to us that, instead of conducting a controlled experiment
in which subjects communicate via sheets of paper, we should simply put 12 individuals
in a room and allow them to speak and listen to one another freely. However, such a
procedure would prevent all individuals' statements from being treated equally and
would devolve into an expertise system in which the subjects who are good at math
speak and the subjects who are poor at math listen. While we believe that such an
expertise system is an effective way to improve social welfare, we also emphasize that it
is not deliberation. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.
70.
We aggregate the signals at this point to avoid the chance that one or two
subjects could develop a reputation for mathematical sophistication/expertise; later we
plan to vary this and allow individuals to develop reputations. Specifically, we will
eventually allow subjects to link their SAT math scores to their recommendations about
whether "a" or "b" is the correct answer to a given math problem.

information about other subjects' recommended answers, subjects then
have 60 seconds to choose their final answer to the math problem. 7'
Because we pay subjects each time that they, individually, answer a
math problem correctly and each time that they all coordinate on the
correct answer, our experiments yield a straightforward measure of
social welfare: the average amount of money that subjects earn in each
experimental condition.
So, for example, if subjects are deliberating
successfully (i.e., coordinating on the correct answers to the math
problems), then we should observe higher payoffs per subject (i.e.,
increasing social welfare), as all of the subjects are earning $1 for
solving the problem correctly and earning an additional $10 because all
of the other subjects also solved the problem correctly. By contrast, if
subjects are unable to deliberate successfully, then a lower amount of
social welfare should be generated, as subjects will not earn an
additional $10 and some may not earn $1 for solving the problem
correctly.
In order to identify whether and under what conditions deliberation
improves social welfare, we compare the average amounts of money that
subjects earn when solving the math problems under each of the
following five treatment conditions:
1.

2.

3.

No Communication: Subjects must choose their answers
completely on their own and without any communication.
This is the control setting.
Deliberation and Free Speech: Subjects may send information
to the other subjects about what they recommend as the
correct answer, and subjects may also receive information
about what others recommend as the correct answer. In this
condition, sending and receiving information are costless.
Indeed, we argue that such sending and receiving are as
close to costless as possible, given that there are no
opportunity costs because subjects have to sit through the
experiment even if they are not sending or receiving
information.
Deliberation with Costly Speech: Subjects may send
information only if they pay a $2 cost, but they may still
receive information for free. This is analogous to deliberation

71.
By giving subjects 60 seconds to choose their final answers, we allow for what
Goodin dubs the "uptake and engagement of information." Specifically, he emphasizes
that "[t]here must also be uptake and engagement-other people must hear or read,
internalize and respond-for that public-sphere activity to count as remotely
deliberative." Goodin, supra note 57, at 60.
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4.

5.

with costly signaling, as is typical in economic models of
communication.
Deliberation with Costly Listening: Subjects may send
information for free, but they must pay a $2 cost to receive
information. This is analogous to economic models of
consumer choice, where consumers must buy information.
Deliberation with Costly Speech and Costly Listening:
Subjects must pay a $2 cost to send and receive information.
This is analogous to real world deliberation, where there are
suppliers and consumers of information.

In addition to varying the conditions under which subjects solve the
math problems, we also vary the size of the groups in which subjects
deliberate. Specifically, for each of the above conditions, we use groups
that consist of four, eight, nine, ten, twelve, or fifteen subjects. While
we begin with a few example questions, after which the subjects are paid
their earnings, subjects accumulate payoffs during the experiment and
are not paid until the end of the experiment (where their answers and
others are shown to them and their payoff tabulated for them). This
makes it impossible for subjects to learn about the other subjects through
repeated trials and assures independence of trials. We then analyze
whether deliberation can improve social welfare for groups of different
sizes under different conditions.
C. Hypotheses
The basic structure of our experiments yields several predictions about
the conditions under which deliberation will (and will not) improve
social welfare. Indeed, because we have established the ideal conditions
for deliberation in that subjects in our experiments have common
interests with one another (recall that each subject in the experiment
earns an additional $10 if every other subject in the room solves a
particular problem correctly), all subjects have an incentive to answer
the math problems correctly. For this reason, they also have an incentive
to reveal truthful information to one another about what they recommend
as the correct answers to the math problems.7 2 Thus, we propose the
following hypotheses:

72.
See Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982); see generally LUPiA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 15, at 48-

49.

Deliberation and Free Speech Hypothesis: If speaking and
listening are costless, then deliberation will improve social welfare,
relative to the amount of social welfare that is generated in our "No
Communication" control condition.
The reasoning behind this prediction is straightforward: Because
subjects have common interests with one another and because it is
costless to send information, subjects who know the correct answer to
73
particular math problems should make truthful recommendations,
while subjects who do not know (or are unsure about) the correct answer
should remain silent. Further, because receiving information is also
costless in this condition, all subjects should choose to receive the
aggregation of recommended answers.74 Given that subjects receive this
aggregation before choosing their final answer to the math problems, we
predict that they will be better able to coordinate on the correct answers
to the math problems and that social welfare will, therefore, increase.
Deliberation with Costly Speech Hypothesis: If individuals must
pay a cost to speak (but not to listen), then deliberation will improve
social welfare, relative to the amount of social welfare that is
generated in our "No Communication" control condition.
The logic behind this prediction is, again, straightforward: Because
receiving information is still costless in this condition, all subjects
should choose to receive the aggregation of recommended answers.
Knowing that all subjects should choose to receive this aggregation,
subjects who are certain (or fairly certain) about the correct answer to
the math problem should pay $2 to recommend an answer to the other
subjects.7 5 The reason for this, of course, is that all subjects have
common interests with one another; thus, subjects who know the correct
answer to a math problem may benefit financially if they share that
answer with the other subjects. Specifically, these subjects will earn $1
if they themselves answer the problem correctly, and they also have a
chance to earn an additional $8 (i.e., the $10 bonus minus the $2 that

73.
Indeed, both Lupia and McCubbins and Crawford and Sobel demonstrate that,
in equilibrium, common interests induce trustworthy statements. See LUPIA &
MCCuBBrNS, supra note 15, at 17-38; Crawford & Sobel, supra note 72, at 1431-51.
Players who know the answer to a problem have a dominant strategy to recommend an
answer. For players who are uncertain, the choice to recommend an answer depends
upon their beliefs about the probability they are correct in their recommendation, relative
to their beliefs about everyone else's probability of answering correctly.

74.

The equilibrium expectations for senders and receivers are, in fact, what we

observe in the experiments.
75.
Again, we observe these predictions to be valid in our experiments.
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they paid to recommend their answer) if all of the other subjects in the
room answer the problem correctly. Note also that, for subjects who
choose to receive information, the fact that subjects paid $2 to send their
recommended answers increases the credibility of those recommendations,
as is the case in economic models with costly signaling.76 It follows from

this that the subjects who know the answer, and only these subjects, will
recommend the correct answer. All other subjects will listen and will
then be able to follow the recommendation and choose the correct
answer. This heightens every player's ability to choose the correct
answer and so it should cause an improvement in social welfare under
this condition.
Deliberation with Costly Listening Hypothesis: If individuals
must pay a cost to listen (but not to speak), then deliberation will
not improve social welfare, relative to the amount of social welfare
that is generated in our "No Communication" control condition.
The reasoning behind this prediction is simply that, if we model only
the actions of the receivers, it reduces to a multi-person dilemma game. 7
The key simplification to multi-person dilemma games is the assumption
that each player has a purely binary choice, and that the interaction is
impersonal in the sense that each player's payoff depends only on the
number of others making the one choice or the other, and not on the
identities of these choosers (i.e., it is an anonymous function).
In modeling the experiment, the receiver's choice can be simplified to
be either 1) pay the cost and to receive the signal (in which case the
dominant strategy will be to answer the problem and to choose the
answer indicated by the signal, as only knowledgeable players will
choose to signal and their dominant strategy is to send the correct answer
to the receivers) or 2) to not pay the cost and not receive the signal. If
players choose not to pay the cost to receive the signal, they then must
choose whether to answer the problem on their own (according to their
prior beliefs regarding the correct answer) or not to answer the problem
and sit out the game.
Because the probability that a particular receiver will be pivotal, and
will thus bring about the collective bonus by his or her decision to

76.
77.

(1978).

See LUPIA & McCuBBINS, supra note 15, at 54.
See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR

acquire information, goes to zero as the size of the group increases,7 8 the
choice for receivers boils down to whether the private benefit of
receiving information exceeds the cost. Specifically, the private benefit
of receiving information in our experiments is equal to $1 minus the
expected value of their answer based on the participant's subjective
beliefs. In our experiments this private benefit of receiving information
therefore cannot exceed $1. It follows that a subject's subjective
probability of being pivotal has to exceed one-fifth, which seems
unlikely even in groups as small as four (if you are in a group of four
and you as the subject believe that everyone else has a 50-50 chance of
answering the problem correctly, and thus making you pivotal, then only
once in eight trials will you actually be pivotal).
Consistent with this logic is the key result of multi-person dilemma
games: that non-contribution is the dominant strategy. In our setting,
this means that players will refuse to acquire information about the
correct answer to the math problem.79 Note that this result is consistent
with much of the literature on attention, which suggests that individuals'
decisions about whether to pay attention to new information are net
benefit calculations and that people ignore most stimuli in their
environment. 80 It is also a fairly intuitive result, once we consider the
contradictory beliefs that an individual must hold in order to think that
he or she will benefit from paying to receive information (for more on
the logic here, see the Appendix). As a consequence, a consensus will
only be reached by chance.
Deliberation with Costly Speech and Costly Listening Hypothesis:
If individuals must pay a cost to speak and listen, then deliberation

78. See the Appendix for further details on this point.
79. We modeled a more complicated, two-person version of the receivers' game in
Richard D. McKelvey, Andrew M. McLennan & Theodore L. Turocy, Gambit: Software
Tools for Game Theory, Version 0.2006.01.20 (2006). available at http://econweb.
tamu.edu/gambit (last visited Apr. 24, 2006). In a game of incomplete information,

Nature moves first to decide if the correct answer is "a" or "b". Then player one chooses
to pay to listen to a signal or not. If she chooses to listen, then she is assumed to
automatically choose the answer, "a"or "b," that she is told in the signal she receives. If
she chooses not to listen, then she must first choose whether or not to answer at all and if
she chooses to answer, she then picks "a" or "b" based on her prior beliefs. Player two
then follows the same set of choices in the same order. Neither player knows what the
other player did. Payoffs are as defined in the experimental setup. There are three
equilibria to this game, none of which involve either player acquiring information. For
the speakers, they have a dominant strategy to tell the truth, if they choose to speak.

Speakers, however, will not speak if no one is listening. The interested reader may
contact Mathew D. McCubbins at mmccubbins@ucsd.edu for further details.
80. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 15, at 17-38.
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will not improve social welfare, relative to the amount of social
welfare that is generated in our "No Communication" control
condition.
As the above hypothesis suggests, we also do not expect to see
improvements in social welfare under the condition that we argue is
most similar to real world deliberative settings-namely, our
"Deliberation with Costly Speech and Costly Listening" condition.
Indeed, when speaking and listening are costly, we do not expect to
observe many instances of successful deliberation, for reasons that are
similar to the ones just described. Specifically, because there does not
exist a pure strategy equilibrium in which individuals pay $2 to receive
information, then individuals who know the correct answer to the math
problem should not be willing to pay $2 to send recommended
answers. 8 Stated differently, if one's recommended answers are simply
going to fall on deaf ears, then why pay the cost to recommend an
answer in the first place? For this reason, we do not expect to see
improvements in social welfare under this condition.
Group Size Hypothesis: As the number of individuals in a
deliberative group increases, then social welfare will decrease, all
else constant.
We also expect that varying amounts of social welfare will be
generated in different size groups. Specifically, as long as each individual's
probability of correctly answering a particular math problem is less than
1, we predict that as the number of individuals in the group increases,
the amount of social welfare that is generated will decrease. The logic
behind this prediction is simply that individuals' expected payoffs for
each math problem are, in part, determined by the product of each

81. Note that Dickson, Hafer, and Landa find that subjects "overspeak" in their
experiments; that is, they communicate twice as often as we would expect them to speak
in equilibrium. See Dickson, et. al., supra note 42, at 15. In our experiments, we also
find evidence of overspeaking because subjects pay to send recommended answers even
when, in equilibrium, we do not expect any subjects to bear the cost associated with
speaking. This similarity between Dickson, Hafer, and Landa's results and our own
results is quite interesting, especially since the structure of their experiments is far
different from our own. Specifically, Dickson, Hafer, and Landa conducted majority
rule voting experiments in which subjects could either speak or listen. See id. at 2.
Thus, their experiments are more like an expertise system (and less like an ideal
deliberative setting) than our own.

individual's probability of answering the problem correctly multiplied
by the $10 bonus that they can earn if they all coordinate.
D. Results
As the results of our experiments demonstrate, the data support each
of our predictions. For example, when subjects may send and receive
information for free, they generate a significantly greater amount of
social welfare than do subjects in our "No Communication" control
condition. Specifically, each subject in our "Deliberation and Free
Speech" condition earned, on average, $5.53 per problem, while subjects
who were not allowed to communicate earned, on average, $1.42 per
problem. As shown in Table 2, a simple difference of means test reveals
that this $4.11 increase in social welfare is statistically significant (p = 0).
Our prediction that improvements in social welfare will occur when
subjects must pay a $2 cost to send information (but may receive
information for free) is also confirmed by our data. Indeed, turning
again to Table 2, we find that subjects in this condition earned, on
average, $3.22 per problem. When compared with the $1.42 that
subjects in the control condition earned, this $1.80 increase in social
welfare (though not as large an increase as the one that we observed in
the "Deliberation and Free Speech" condition) is also statistically
significant (p = 0).

As for the conditions under which we did not expect to observe
improvements in social welfare (i.e., the "Deliberation with Costly
Listening" and the "Deliberation with Costly Speech and Costly
Listening" conditions), our predictions are again confirmed, with the
addition of one unanticipated finding. First, as expected, there was no
improvement in social welfare when subjects had to pay a $2 cost to
receive information, but could speak for free.8 2 Indeed, the $1.09 that

82.
We also ran a version of this experiment in which subjects only had to pay $1
to receive information. Although such a reduction in the cost of receiving information
increases the expected net benefit associated with receiving such information, subjects
still, by and large, chose not to pay to receive information. Further, such a reduction in
the cost of information did not enable subjects to deliberate successfully and to achieve
the collective bonus.
Note also that the results of our "1I cost to receive information" experiments point to
another finding that is important in the literature on deliberation. Specifically, to the
extent that scholars emphasize the participatory benefits of deliberation, our findings
suggest that such benefits will not exist uniformly, that many (most) citizens will simply
refuse to participate in a deliberative exercise, even if you pay them. The idea that we
can establish juries, large and small, across the country, for every type of decision, to
negotiate every different plan of actions, every policy, and every election, would be
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each subject earned per problem in this condition is statistically
indistinguishable from the $1.42 that subjects in the control condition
earned (see Table 2).
As for our results for the "Deliberation with Costly Speech and Costly
Listening" condition,83 we discovered something a bit surprising, not to
mention disconcerting-that deliberation under this condition actually
leads to a significant decrease in social welfare, relative to the control
group. Specifically, subjects in this condition earned $1.09 less than
subjects in the control group (see Table 2). Given that this experimental
condition is most similar to real world deliberative settings, this result
suggests that scholars' assumption that deliberation will improve social
welfare is unfounded. It further suggests that while deliberation may
seem desirable in theory, it is detrimental in practice.
Given this result that deliberation leads to significant decreases in
social welfare under realistic conditions, we then examined whether this
result holds for all group sizes. The reason that we conducted such an
analysis, is that our aggregate results could be masking nuances in the
data-namely, the possibility that deliberation under realistic conditions
increases social welfare as the number of individuals in the group
decreases. Thus, we broke our results down to examine whether
deliberation under realistic conditions increases social welfare in smaller
size groups.

tantamount to calling citizens to jury service 200 times per year, or more-as well as

time-is, needless to say, limited.
83. Note that we also ran a version of this experiment in which subjects only had
to pay $1 to send information and $1 to receive information. Even with such a reduction
in the costs of sending and receiving information, most subjects still chose not to pay to
send and receive information.

Further, reducing the cost of sending and receiving

information to $1 did not enable subjects to deliberate successfully and earn the
collective bonus.

TABLE

2.

SOCIAL WELFARE BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION*

Experimental Condition:

No Communication (Control)
(N =120)

Amount of Money

Average Increase

Earned Per
Problem, Per
Subject:

in Money Earned
(Relative to
Control):

S1.42

Free Communication

$5.53

$4.11

(N= 120)

(P= 0)

(P= o)

$2 Cost to Send Information

$3.22

$1.80

(N = 58)

(P = 0)

(P = 0)

$2 Cost to Receive Information
(N=58)

$1.09

S-0.33

$2 Cost to Send and Receive

$0.33

$-.09

Information

(P = 0)

(P= 0)

(N = 82)
*Boldface indicates a significant difference, relative to the no communication
condition.

As the results in Table 3 demonstrate, however, deliberation still does
not improve social welfare even in groups as small as four people.
Indeed, when we compare the amount of social welfare that a group of
four subjects generated in the control condition (i.e., $1.36 per subject,
per problem) with the amount of social welfare that a group of four
subjects generated in our "Deliberation with Costly Speech and Costly
Listening" condition (i.e., $1.79 per subject, per problem), we see that
there is not a statistically significant difference between these two
amounts of social welfare. This finding is, of course, an improvement over
our aggregate result (namely, that deliberation under realistic conditions
decreases social welfare), but notice that once the group size increases to
eight, nine, ten, twelve, or fifteen subjects, we again see statistically
significant decreases in social welfare, relative to the control group.
Note also that there is a linear decline in the amount of social welfare as
the size of the group increases, which is consistent with our prediction.
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TABLE

3. SOCIAL WELFARE BY GROUP SIZE FOR OUR REALISTIC
DELIBERATIVE SETTING*

EXPERIMENTAL

GROUP

GROUP

GROUP

GROUP

GROUP

GROUP

CONDITION:

OF4

OF8

OF9

OF10

OF 12

OF 15

No

$1.36

$2.07

$1.95

$1.99

$0.38

$1.21

Communication

(Control)
$2 Cost to Send

$1.79

$0.92

$0.07

$0.02

$-0.03

$-0.17

and Receive

(P = 0.12)

(P = 0)

(P = 0)

(P = 0)

(P = 0)

(P = 0)

Information

*Boldface indicates a significant decrease in social welfare, relative to a particular group
size in the control condition.

For comparison, we also calculated the amounts of social welfare that
different size groups generate in our "Deliberation and Free Speech"
condition. Consistent with our aggregate result, we find that, for each
group size, subjects in this idealized deliberative condition are able to
increase their social welfare, relative to the amounts of social welfare
that groups in the control condition generate. However, when we look
across the bottom row of Table 4, we see that our prediction that social
welfare will decrease as the group size increases holds even in this
idealized setting. That is, although not a perfectly linear pattern, we do
see an overall decline in social welfare as the group size increases from
four subjects to fifteen subjects. Indeed, the amount of social welfare
that a group of four subjects generated (i.e., $7.29 per subject, per
problem) is significantly greater than the amounts of social welfare that
a group of eight, twelve, or fifteen subjects generated (i.e., $5.76, $3.06,
and $4.85, respectively).

TABLE

4.

SOCIAL WELFARE BY GROUP SIZE FOR THE IDEALIZED
DELIBERATIVE SETTING*

Experimental
Condition:

No

Group
of 4

Group
of 8

Group
of 9

Group
ofl0

Group
ofl2

Group
of 15

$1.36

$2.07

$1.95

$1.99

$0.38

$1.21

Communication

Free

$7.29

Communication

$5.76

$6.42

$7.48

$3.06

$4.85

(P= 0.004)

(P = 0.059)

(P= 0.35)

(P = 0)

(P = 0)

*Boldface indicates a significant decrease in social welfare, relative to the amount of social
welfare generated by a group of four when communication was free.

E. A Postscript:More Bad News
In the deliberative setting of our experiments, the subjects bear trivial
or no costs to communicate. Relatedly, they have no clear alternatives
for reaching welfare-enhancing collective decisions. We take up an
alternative in the final part of this Article. But let us consider the first
matter. If, as we show above, participants in this stylized experiment
will not deliberate to welfare-enhancing outcomes where the incentives
and opportunities for deliberation are plentiful, then what makes us think
that, as we add more complex, costly decisions, decision-making will
improve?

Rather, the logic of our argument suggests that, as you

introduce more strenuous conditions (recall the discussion in Part II
above of Ferejohn's institutional conditions for deliberation), then the

decision-making in deliberative settings becomes more difficult.
Among the practical difficulties that arise when the decisionmaking
process within the deliberative setting becomes more difficult are
decisionmaking pathologies of the usual sort. These include the problem
of ambiguity; that is, how are participants going to best interpret
messages from one another? The encoding-decoding problems in
communicative settings84 are well known; and we summarize the key
theses in other Articles.
84.
Cheryl Boudreau et al., Symposium: Theories of Statutory Interpretation:
Statutory Interpretation and the Jntentional(ist) Stance, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 2131

(2005); Cheryl Boudreau et al., The Judge as a Fly on the Wall: Interpretive Lessons from
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Further, in many real world deliberative settings, there will not exist
an objectively correct answer to a particular problem or policy issue.
The absence of an objectively correct solution further complicates the
deliberative enterprise, for it is quite possible (in fact, likely) that no one
in the deliberative group will have knowledge about the particular
problem or issue at hand.85 And, it is well known that in the absence of

in the group, citizens do not (and cannot)
a knowledgeable individual
86
learn from one another.
Additionally, the phenomenon of strategic behavior in decisionmaking settings is, too, an element that can stand in the way of effective
deliberation and socially beneficial decisionmaking. Sure, advocates of
deliberation might assume these problems away by insisting on the
normative point that the deliberative model contemplates that individuals
will behave sincerely and, moreover, that ambiguity will be clarified in
the crucible of discursive debate and dialogue. However, we return to
the thrust of our empirical point, and that is that deliberation experiments
with conditions and processes that track rather well deliberation

theorists' expectations about decisionmaking outcomes raise serious
doubts that these assumptions can be squared with the real world.
IV. EXPERTISE SYSTEMS: AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO
INCREASE SOCIAL WELFARE

Having demonstrated that deliberation decreases social welfare under
realistic conditions, we now briefly discuss a more effective method of

the Positive Political Theory of Legislation, available at http://law.bepress.com/sandiego/
lwps/pllt/art37.
85.
A real world context in which all citizens in a deliberative group often lack
knowledge about the issue at hand is our jury system. Indeed, in an empirical study of
jurors' deliberations and comprehension of issues, a special committee formed by the
American Bar Associated concluded that jurors do have significant difficulty with large
volumes of data, especially when the evidence is not about a topic with which the
jurors are already familiar. In one six-week trade secret case jurors reported they
"felt overwhelmed by the technical nature of the evidence.... In post-trial interviews,
some jurors could recall nothing about the voir dire, opening statements, or the antitrust
aspects of the case." Special Comm. ABA Sec. Litig., Jury Comprehension in Complex
Cases: Report of a Special Committee of the ABA Litigation Section 25, 25-26 (1989);
see also Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of
AdversarialProcesses,48 DEPAUL L. REv. 355 (1998).
86.
LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 15, at 55.

improving social welfare: expertise systems.87 Unlike most deliberative
settings (where all participants are expected to speak, listen, and learn
from one another), the defining characteristic of an expertise system is
that at least one participant has knowledge about a particular topic, and
the other participants then have opportunities to learn from that
knowledgeable participant's statements. For the reasons that we discuss
below, an expertise system better enables individuals to improve both
their own welfare, as well as the group's welfare.
We agree with Lynn Sanders 88 and Arthur Lupia 89 that expertise
systems are not consistent with many views of deliberation, where
equality among participants is a key feature.9" Nonetheless, an expertise
system is a superior method of improving social welfare because it
satisfies the conditions that are required for people to learn from others.
As Lupia and McCubbins 91 emphasize, learning from others will occur
only if 1) people perceive that a speaker is knowledgeable and 2) people
believe that that speaker is trustworthy (which will occur when the
speaker has a personal reputation for being trustworthy, has common
interests with the participants, or is subject to an institutional
condition-such as a penalty for lying or the threat of verification-that
induces trustworthy statements). Otherwise, individuals will not have an
incentive to pay attention to and learn from the speaker's statements, as
Lupia and McCubbins's experiments convincingly demonstrate.
As should be clear from our previous discussion, it is unlikely that
these conditions for learning will be met in most deliberative settings.
Indeed, because all participants (regardless of their level of expertise)
are expected to speak and then learn from one another in most theories
of deliberation, the welfare-enhancing effects of having knowledgeable
individuals in the group are dampened. Further, because most deliberative
settings do little to inform participants about who is knowledgeable and
who is not, it is difficult for participants to identify the individuals that
they should listen to and learn from. Given the opportunity costs
associated with payirig attention to others' statements, if people cannot
discern who is knowledgeable, then they will not pay attention. Thus,
even though the conditions for trust are often met in deliberative settings
(as they were in our experiments because the subjects had common
87. Expert systems are defined as systems in which one or more persons outside
the group are brought in to inform participants. We distinguish this from circumstances
in which there are varying levels of expertise within the group.
88.
See Sanders, supra note 51, at 347, 350.
89.
Lupia, supra note 16, at 43-45.
90.
See, e.g., Cohen & Fung, supra note 50, at 23.
91.

LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 15, at 64.
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interests with one another), the inability to determine who is knowledgeable
and who is not decreases social welfare.
With an expertise system, however, one or several participants in the
group are established as having knowledge about a particular topic, and
the other participants may then listen to and learn from their statements.
As such, we expect expertise systems to improve social welfare, so long
as the conditions for trust are also met.
Fortunately for us, our claim that expertise systems will improve
social welfare is not simply a conjecture; indeed, experiments that are
very similar in structure to our own have demonstrated the social
welfare-enhancing effects of expertise systems. 92 In these experiments,
subjects were also asked to solve math problems, but instead of having
all subjects send and receive information to one another, these
experiments revealed the correct answer to the math problem to one of
the subjects (dubbed "the speaker") and then allowed the speaker to
make a statement to the other subjects about the correct answer to the
math problem.
As expected, when subjects are exposed to a knowledgeable speaker
who is also subject to one of the conditions for trust that we mentioned
above, we observe significant improvements in social welfare. Indeed,
as shown in Table 5, when one subject in the group has knowledge about
the correct answer to the math problem and has common interests with
the other subjects, then there is a 223% improvement in social welfare,
relative to the amount of social welfare that subjects in the control group
generated (note that, as in our deliberation experiments, subjects in the
control group solved the problems completely on their own). Further,
when a knowledgeable speaker is subject to other conditions for trust,
such as a penalty for lying or the threat of verification, large improvements
in social welfare also occur (to the tune of a 200% increase in social
welfare in the penalty for lying condition and in the verification
condition). Taken together, these results demonstrate the large socialwelfare enhancing effects of expertise systems.

Assessing the
92.
Cheryl Boudreau, When Do Heuristics Help Citizens?
Conditions Under Which Heuristics Improve Decisions (2006) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).

TABLE 5. IMPROVEMENTS IN SOCIAL WELFARE WITH
AN EXPERTISE SYSTEM*
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION

PERCENT IMPROVEMENT,
RELATIVE TO CONTROL GROUP

Control Group
( = 66)
COMMON INTERESTS

223%

(N = 62)

(P= 0)

$15 PENALTY FOR LYING

200%
(P= 0)

(N = 68)
100% VERIFICATION

(N = 74)

200%
(P = 0)

* Bold face indicates a significant improvement over the control group.

Before concluding, we wish to note that not all scholars of deliberation
have overlooked the benefits of expertise systems. Indeed, many scholars
who advocate deliberation actually recommend some form of an expertise
system. To take just one prominent example of this phenomenon,
consider the deliberative setting that Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin
recommend:
[D]eliberators will go to randomly assigned groups of 15 for the first event-at
which they will sit together to watch a live television debate on the leading issues
between the principalnational candidates.... The parties will also be invited to
spell out their basic positions on the selected issues in a briefing document
suitablefor the mass public.... Phase two begins at 10:30 with the small group's
first order of business: the deliberatorsmust select a foreman, by majority vote,
before they proceed to their main task-which is to prepare their contribution for
the large group meeting of 500 that will take place after lunch. During this
afternoon session, local representativesof the rival parties will appear before the
group and try to answer any questions raised about their parties' television
Each large group will have its moderator-perhapsa local
presentations....
judge, perhaps a member of a civic group like the League of Women Voters. She
will soon be in9 proud possession of the question lists submitted by each small
group foreman. s

As the italicized portions of the text reveal, some form of an expertise
system is in place at various stages of Ackerman and Fishkin's
deliberative setting. Indeed, there are many opportunities for participants in
93.

See Ackerman & Fishkin, supra note 2, at 13-15.
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this setting to learn from candidates and parties, from the foremen that
they select to lead them, and from the moderators-all of whom
presumably possess some form of expertise on the topic in question.
There are, of course, many other examples of this phenomenon that we
could draw upon, but our point here is merely to illustrate that at least
some scholars of deliberation seem to have an expertise system in mind.
That they ignore the tradeoff between participant equality and expertise
is another matter.
V. CONCLUSION

We began this Article by questioning scholars' untested assumption
that unalloyed deliberation improves social welfare, and we demonstrated
experimentally that, contrary to popular belief, deliberation under realistic
conditions actually decreases social welfare. Indeed, even in groups as
small as four individuals, deliberation under realistic conditions does not
improve social welfare, and once the size of the group increases to eight
individuals, we observe significant declines in social welfare. Based
upon these experimental results, it appears that the deliberative policies
and programs that scholars have advocated are doomed to be not only
ineffective, but also detrimental.
These findings are also of consequence to those who emphasize that
the process of deliberation has intrinsic value independent of increases in
social welfare. The difficulty with justifying deliberation based on
process alone is that when costs of listening and speaking are taken into
account typically no one participates. Furthermore, arguments for the
intrinsic value of deliberation assume that participation does not reduce
social welfare; however, our experiments show there may actually be a
reduction in social welfare as a result of deliberation. Therefore, for
participation to be, on net beneficial one must believe its intrinsic value
exceeds the resulting declines in social welfare. As we have shown in
our experiment and contrary to all other models of deliberation, an
improvement in social welfare is not guaranteed.
When can social welfare be improved? We presented results here on
expertise systems, and we argued that such systems are superior to most
deliberative settings because they satisfy the conditions required for
trust, communication, and learning. We also drew upon other experimental
evidence, which demonstrates that expertise systems can in fact increase
social welfare. Indeed, the limited, and often unverifiable success, that

most deliberative simulations have achieved, derives from their alloying
deliberation with an expertise or expert system.
Based upon these findings, the prospect of achieving a deliberative
democracy appears to be quite difficult, if not impossible.9 4 Indeed,
94. Note that because we paid subjects for participating in our experiments, our
experiments were designed to overcome the opportunity costs associated with
participation. However, even when compensating subjects for their time, for their
energy, and for the other activities that they had to forego, we still did not often observe
increases in social welfare. That said, it is possible that even with monetary
compensation, subjects' opportunity costs might have outweighed the benefits that they
received. A real world example of this phenomenon, of course, is the $15 per day that
citizens earn for serving on juries. This amount is, needless to say, often insufficient to
overcome the opportunity costs that many jurors face, and we wonder how many citizens
would be willing to participate in a deliberative setting for $15 per day. We suspect that
it is not many.
Although at this stage of our research the prospect of a deliberative democracy appears
to be quite dim, in future replications of these experiments, we plan to vary other
parameters in our theory and assess experimentally whether there exist any robust
conditions under which subjects will deliberate to welfare-enhancing outcomes. We
have found so far that, as we decrease the cost of receiving information to $1, subjects
still tend not to receive information. Another parameter that we plan to vary is the
opportunity cost associated with receiving information; that is, in future experiments,
some subjects will have to pay a cost to receive information, while others will be able to
receive information for free. Under such conditions, we expect that the game will still be
an n-person dilemma and that subjects will not deliberate successfully.
Yet another experimental variation that we have begun to conduct is to allow subjects
to exchange reasons for why answer "a" or answer "b" is the correct answer to a math
problem. Although this variation does not alter the game between the senders and
receivers, it is analogous to what many democratic theorists appear to have in mind when
they advocate deliberation. Specifically, many scholars emphasize the importance of
allowing citizens to reason with one another when considering particular policies or
problems. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989); Ackerman
& Fishkin, supra note 2; Cohen & Fung, supra note 50, at 24. We are currently
implementing a version of such citizen reasoning in our experiments.
In our reasoning experiments, we allow subjects to send not only their recommendations
for answer "a" or answer "b," but also a reason for choosing one of these two answers.
So, each answer choice for each problem has a reason associated with it. For the correct
answers to particular math problems, the reasons simply consist of short explanations/
proofs that show how and why a particular answer is the correct one (drawn from the
SAT practice book). For the incorrect answers to the math problems, the reasons consist
of similar explanations/proofs, but these explanations contain one flawed premise that
leads to an incorrect conclusion. Such incorrect explanations/proofs are analogous to the
illogical, unreasoned arguments that citizens may make when debating particular issues.
Our preliminary experimental results demonstrate, allowing subjects to exchange
reasons in this manner still does not enable them to improve social welfare when there
are costs associated with receiving information. Further, subjects are no more willing to
pay to receive information when reasons are provided than they are in the experiments
that we present in the tables above. These preliminary results are consistent with our
expectations (indeed, the costs and expected benefits associated with sending and
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because participants in our stylized experiment (where there were ample
incentives and opportunities for deliberation) often did not deliberate to
welfare-enhancing outcomes, it is unlikely that participants will be able
to do so when placed in more complex deliberative settings and when
faced with more difficult and costly decisions.
Nevertheless, in presenting our results, we have heard three general
criticisms. First, some scholars claim that outside of the lab, when
people are put in realistic deliberative settings, deliberation is more
likely. In essence, this first criticism boils down to the comment that the
communication environment that we model and then test is not rich
enough. So, for example, scholars often emphasize that reasoning is a
key part of persuasion, 95 notwithstanding our finding that even when we
allow the subjects to send reasons, i.e., proofs, for their recommended
choices, they still are not able to improve social welfare. We also hear
that non-anonymous communication is more conducive to persuasion,9 6
or that more complicated forms of communication will enhance the
likelihood of successful deliberation. These latter two challenges,
however, overlook many of the details of our experiment, where we did
everything possible to encourage subjects to deliberate and reach a
consensus. They also overlook the fact that in more "realistic"
communicative settings, where choices are not binary, where problems
do not have objectively correct answers, 97 where communication is often
ambiguous, where opportunity costs are real (at least for some individuals),
where interests conflict, and where inattention is the natural reaction if
receiving information in our reasoning experiments are the same as in the experiments
presented in this Article).
95. Note that this emphasis on reasoning is not consistent with the theory and
experiments which model and then test the conditions for persuasion. LUPIA &
McCUBBINS, supra note 15, at 43-65. Lupia and McCubbins emphasize that the
conditions for trust and persuasion need to exist or the reasons will be ignored as well as
the signal. If the conditions for trust and persuasion are absent, then people will ignore
the reasons as well as the conclusion.
96. Note that this claim does not take into account the literature in psychology
cited in Lupia & McCubbins. Id. at 27-38.
97.
Indeed, we often hear criticisms that the choices we ask the subjects to makeinvolving the answers to math problems-are not the same sort of topics to be decided
by deliberative bodies. Our response is that, if people have trouble achieving a
consensus about math problems, which have verifiably correct answers, why would we
expect moral conflicts, involving issues such as race, religion, language, ethnicity,
identity and so forth to allow consensus to be achieved easier. See GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 13-51 for a prominent example of the argument that
deliberation is the best way to resolve moral conflicts.

individuals cannot figure out whether others are knowledgeable and
trustworthy, 98 successful deliberation can only become more difficult.
To recall the song "New York, New York," if you cannot make it here,
you cannot make it anywhere!
Second, we frequently hear criticisms that it is our choice environment
(which creates an n-person dilemma game) that makes costly receiving
unlikely and thus deliberation impossible. Scholars who advance this
criticism then argue that if we were to adopt some form of a majority
rule game in our experiments, then we would overcome the n-person
dilemma and thus make deliberation possible. However, we emphasize
that the n-person dilemma in the game is not removed as the size of the
majority shrinks from 100% to 50% plus one, and we also note that the
n-person dilemma nature of the game becomes insurmountable as the
group size increases.9 9 Furthermore, if we have to resort to majority rule
rather than rule by consensus to achieve improved outcomes, then we
have no reason to think that our existing political institutions are in need
of the deliberative reforms that many scholars advocate.
Third, scholars often argue that our experimental results merely
suggest that the notion of deliberation favored by radical democratic
theorists (one which emphasizes equality over expertise, as we do in our
theory and experiments) is the wrong model of deliberation and that
there are alternative models of deliberation that allow people to develop
reputations and gain information from experts, what we have called
expertise systems. 100 We agree. Indeed, we are presently extending our
model and experiments to test various forms of expertise (for example,
we plan to allow subjects to send their SAT scores with their suggested
answers and allow subjects to track the reputations of subjects who have
sent recommendations previously, and so forth). 1° Our response is,

98. LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 15, at 64.
99. Notice that in the political science literature on turnout (starting with William
H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 25 (1968)), the voters' decisions of whether or not to turnout also create an nperson dilemma game. Indeed, much of this literature argues that rational individuals
should not turnout, just as we suggest that no one should choose to pay a cost to receive
information.
100. Repeat play, which is necessary for the development of reputations, is a twoedged sword. It may lead to an enhancement in communication and it may not,
depending, of course, on the conditions. Joel Sobel, A Theory of Credibility, 52 REV.
ECON. STuD. 557 (1985).
101.
We are not especially sanguine, however, that adversarial experts, absent the
conditions for trust, will create a communication environment, through their arguments
alone, that enhances the prospects that the "jurors" will actually be able to learn and
develop expertise themselves. See Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, The
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however, that these forms of deliberation will only work if the
conditions for trust are established, 1 2 and moreover, that these expertise
systems already exist and are widely relied upon throughout our society,
economy, and polity."0 3
Further, what we observe in the many web-based efforts to form
deliberative communities and the various efforts to organize deliberative
settings is that scholars and activists often seem to want to establish
expertise systems. But do we need separate deliberative communities
(which, in reality, are often expertise systems) for every decision? It
seems to us that establishing a council or some other deliberative body
for questions that run from the mundane-should parking fees be
charged at shopping malls-to the divisive-should the alternative
minimum tax be reduced or replaced with a graduated tax, a flat tax, a
VAT or something else-to the exotic-how we dispose of uranium
hexafluoride and should we further restrict off road vehicles to protect
the Swallenia alexandrae-is a bit impractical, if not completely
unworkable. Indeed, while Fishkin may have shown that people can be
0 4
brought up to speed on one topic, through days of intense training,"
it
seems doubtful that citizens can or will participate in more than one of
these settings. And how does creating a new technocratic elite to answer
these questions improve on the technocratic elite we already have, which
has been the goal of democratic theorists? Further, even if citizens are
willing to spend their free time and energy participating in such settings,
will they be able to reach a consensus or will basic conflicts about who
gets what from government persist? Given that politics is about the
redistribution of rights, income, and wealth, it seems unlikely that
conflict will dissipate in these deliberative settings.
All of this being said, we should note that this Article represents only
the first step of a large research agenda devoted to exploring the
conditions under which deliberation can and cannot work. To preview
additional questions (and answers) that we propose in future Articles,
consider the following: What is the nature of the necessary conditions
for deliberation to improve social welfare? Answer: Stringent. What is
Battle for Truth: Theory and Experiments Regarding Competition and the Adversarial
System (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
102.
See LUPIA & McCUBBINS, supra note 15, at 68-78.
103. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Who Controls? Information
and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 361 (1994).
104.

JAMES

S.

DEMOCRACY (1997).

FISHKIN,

THE

VOICE

OF THE PEOPLE:

PUBLIC

OPINION

AND

the optimal group size for deliberation? Answer: Less than four. Can
we ever achieve ideal deliberation, where everyone speaks and everyone
listens? Answer: No. These questions and answers represent just some
of the lines of inquiry that we will later pursue, but suffice it to say for
now, that deliberation appears to be, not a cure all for societal ills, but
rather a cause of decreased social welfare.
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VI. APPENDIX
The logic of our n-player, sender-receiver model is the same as that
10 5
found in a simultaneous information elicitation multi-agent system.
The class of multi agent computations presented here is that of anonymous
functions. An anonymous function is one where the function's value
does not depend on the identity of the players but only on their choices.
In other words, a permutation of players' choices will not change the
value of the function. This class of functions is quite elementary and
often used in models. Among the anonymous functions are majority
rule, consensus, unanimity, average, variance, order statistic, percentile
and more. The game we present has aspects of a public good (everyone
benefits ten-fold if they reach a consensus). The literature on public
goods games where there is a basic tension between players' individual
efforts and the desire to supply a public good. Often, this literature
demonstrates the impossibility of supplying the public good, even in
situations where it is the socially optimal action. In this literature,
players' main consideration is how much they can influence the result of
the game, namely their pivotalness versus their expected contribution. 1°6
In the context of our game, for individuals in the deliberative group to
be willing to pay to receive information, they must believe that the
information is going to increase their payoff. In simple decision
theoretic terms we can define the conditions when a player will buy
information. Let Pr be a player's subjective probability that she will
answer the math problem correctly. Let Pp be a player's subjective
probability that she is pivotal in determining the collective payoff. Let
VI be the payoff for individually answering correctly and let V2 be the
bonus payoff for reaching a consensus answer (these values are $1 and
$10 in our current experiment). Let y be the cost of acquiring
105.
See, e.g., Nabil I. A1-Najjar & Rann Smorodinsky, Pivotal Players and the
Characterizationof Influence, 92 J. ECON. THEORY 318 (2000); Rann Smorodinsky &
Moshe Tennenholtz, Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems, 70
TWENTIETH CONFERENCE ON UNCERTAINTY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 528, 528-35
(2004) [hereinafter Smorodinsky & Tennenholtz, Sequential Information]; see generally
Rann Smorodinsky & Moshe Tennenholtz, Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party
Computations-The Anonymous Case, 55 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 213 (2005)
[hereinafter Smorodinsky & Tennenholtz, OvercomingFree Riding].
106.
See Smorodinsky & Tennenholtz, Sequential Information, supra note 105, at
528-35. See generally Smorodinsky & Tennenholtz, Overcoming Free Riding, supra
note 105.

information (this is $2 in our current experiment). Then, a player will
acquire information (which is assumed to be truthful when provided, as
all players here have common interests," 7 if and only if:
0(-Pr)

> 7/(VI+PpV2) (1)

From inspection of Equation 1, it is the cost of information
acquisition, relative to its expected benefit, that determines whether or
not information will be acquired. The comparative statics from Equation
1 also make sense. The greater is y, all else constant, the less likely a
player will be to acquire information. Thus, when y =$O, as in our
treatment when listening is free, players will always acquire information
(unless they are certain they know the correct answer). The smaller is
Pp, all else constant, the less likely it will be that a player will acquire
information. In our experiment, if Pp is less that .1, then, given our
payoffs, it will never be in any player's interest to acquire information
when the cost of doing so, y, is equal to $2. Similarly, the smaller are
the benefits to answering correctly, V, or V2, the less likely it will be for
a player to acquire information, all else constant.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, assume that individuals
believe that they will receive accurate and truthful information (if they
believe otherwise, which might occur if the problem is so difficult that
no one is able to answer it, then they will not purchase the information
and the outcome of the game is one where the participants coordinate
only by chance). If individuals buy the information and then solve the
problem correctly, they can only ensure that they earn $1, which is not
enough to compensate for the cost of the information, which is $2. If
player j, for example, sees the math problem. as being pretty difficult (so
that the mean of the distributions of pa and pr are .5 and .6 respectively),

but not extraordinarily so, then even in groups as small as five subjects,
there are no beliefs about Pr that support paying for information when
the cost is $2. The cost would have to drop to less than fifty cents in this
example before anyone would consider acquiring information (if they
held the same beliefs about themselves as they do the others). In this
case, the cost of information, relative to the potential benefit (the right
hand side of Equation 1), would have to be more than twice what it is in
our experiments (i.e., the potential benefits would have to be 22 times
the cost of information). While we will experiment with these conditions in
107.

Crawford & Sobel, supra note 72.
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future research, however, most scholars have judged the costs of
political participation to be roughly equal to the benefits, °8 with many
viewing the costs as exceeding the benefits. 1 9
In larger groups the problems are worse yet. With fifteen people, even
if the mean of the distributions of pia, pir and Pr are all .99 respectively
(so it is the easiest problem we could give the group to solve), then y
<$.10 (thus the cost of acquiring information is more than two orders of
magnitude smaller than the potential benefits of acquiring information),
or, with y =$2 as in our experiments, player j must think she has less
than a 77% chance of answering correctly (and thus believes that the
probability that she is drawn from the same distribution as all of the
other players is less than .00000001). As group size exceeds 110, Pp drops
so far that the value of consensus is exceeded by the individual value of
answering correctly, even when the problem is, as just assumed, the
easiest we could give and the cost of acquiring information would have
to be less than .00001 of the potential benefit to get anyone to buy it.
As long as the cost of information exceeds its private benefit, in order
to make the purchase worth the cost, it must be the case that purchasing
the information increases the probability of earning the $10 bonus that
comes from coordinating with everyone else. However, because each
individual can only affect his or her own answer by receiving information,
the purchase of information will only be worthwhile if it increases the

probability of getting the collective bonus through this one person's own
actions. Thus, individuals must believe that they are pivotal, that their
actions and their actions alone determine whether or not they earn the
collective bonus."0 They must believe that everyone else either knows
108. John A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, The Paradoxof Not Voting: A Decision
Theoretic Analysis, 68 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 525 (1974); Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 99.
109.
See generally ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957); GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS (1967).

110. If we had modeled the decision rule as majority or anything less than
unanimity, the basic logic of the argument about pivotalness would still apply.
Individuals would have to believe that they were the pivotal person to the group
achieving the $10 coordinating bonus. In any large "N" setting, even with majority rule,
the probability of being pivotal is exceedingly low. If we had used a non-unanimous
decision rule we may have seen some changes in behavior. For instance, it may be that
more people would buy information, which is related to the higher, although still slim,
odds of being the pivotal player. However, modeling deliberation as something other
than consensus would not change the basic theoretical results. For an example of
modeling deliberation as a majority-rule, expertise exercise, see Dickson, et. al., supra
note 42, at 2.

the correct answer to the problem or will receive information about it.
So how do individuals calculate the probability that everyone else will
answer the problem correctly?
In general, the problem is that this game requires k-level thinking."'
That is, individuals must have beliefs about everyone else in the game,
they must have beliefs about everyone else's beliefs, they must have
beliefs about everyone else's beliefs about everyone else's beliefs, and
so on. Thinking this through may be quite expensive cognitively. This
is especially true in our experiments and in ideal deliberative settings,
where people do not know each other and cannot draw inferences about
each other based upon how they look, act, speak, smell, dress and so
on." l2 People may not bother to think through the game in order to
111.
See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, A Cognitive
HierarchyModel of Games, 119 Q. J. ECON. 861 (2004); Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent P.
Crawford & Bruno Broseta, Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An
Experimental Study, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1193 (2001); Vincent P. Crawford, Lying for
Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentationof Intentions, 93
AM. ECON. REV. 133 (2003); Teck-Hua Ho, Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt, Iterated
Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests", 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 947 (1998); Rosemarie Nagel, Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental
Study, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1313 (1995); Dale 0. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, Experimental
Evidence on Players' Models of Other Players, 25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 309 (1994);
Dale 0. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and
Experimental Evidence, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 218 (1995); Miguel Costa-Gomes &

Vincent P Crawford, Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An
Experimental Study (UCSD Discussion Paper 2004-11, 2004), available at http://weber.
ucsd.edu/-vcrawfor/16Dec05GuessingMain.pdf; Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri,
FatalAttraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek"
Games (UCSD Discussion Paper 2004-12R, 2005), available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/
-vcrawfor/30Jan05Hide& Seek.pdf.
112.
Indeed, if such signals existed, then individuals could not be equal. If they
were allowed to know certain characteristics about each other, then they may be able to
simplify this cognitive problem by reducing the range of beliefs that they hold about
each other. If this were the case, however, then it is not clear that each person's
statements, if made, would be judged equally by all of the other participants, and it is
also not clear that information and collective decisionmaking would be improved. In the
game we present in our experiments, all individuals share a common incentive, and they
earn money if they answer the problems correctly, and they earn much more money if
they all answer the problems correctly. This will not be true in unstructured deliberative
settings; thus, the conditions for trust among the participants may not exist and deception
among the participants may arise, which will lead to a loss of trust among all
participants, which in turn will lead to a collapse of deliberation. On the flip side, if
trustworthy and knowledgeable individuals arise in this setting (which might occur if
individuals are allowed to get to know one another), then these individuals will be
listened to and others will not be, so the deliberative setting will become an expertise
system.
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calculate the probability that they are pivotal. And, for there to be an
equilibrium where everyone who needs help pays to receive information,
everyone has to believe that they are pivotal (and that others are either
pivotal just like them or know the answer without help) and thus have an
incentive to pay for the information, as they are more or less certain their
actions will bring about the collective bonus.
However, there are only two ways that all individuals who need help
can believe that they are pivotal, and neither of these sets of beliefs is
supportable. First, these individuals must believe that they do not know
the correct answer to the problem and that others do know the correct
answer. They must also believe either 1) that others know the answer
and know that they know it or 2) that others are just like them and
believe that they do not know the correct answer and believe that others
do know the answer. Thus, there are two types of individuals: first,
individuals who know the correct answer without help and second,
individuals who do not know the correct answer to the problem and
believe that others do. This second type is the prospective receiver of
communication.
Consider the following example, in which there is one speaker and
two receivers: Receiver A and Receiver B. In order to believe he is
pivotal, Receiver A must simultaneously believe that he does not know
the answer but that Receiver B does know the answer. Concurrently,
Receiver B must believe that she does not know the correct answer while
thinking that Receiver A does know the correct answer. These beliefs are
unsupportable, as Receiver A's assessment of himself and his
assessment of Receiver B is at odds with what he believes Receiver B
believes, even about himself. As such, people will not hold these
beliefs, and the equilibrium where everyone who needs the information
pays to receive it is unlikely.
To see the logic here, we can define the probability of pivotalness, Pp,
to be the product of more basic probabilities, let Pp = pa*p'P, where
pia is player j's subjective probability that all other players, i=l,.. .n,
will answer the math problem, while pi", is player j's subjective
probability that all other players i=l, ..

.

n, will answer the problem

correctly, if they answer. Take for example, the case where there are ten
players, that is player j and nine other players. Let the mean of the
distribution of P1m=.9, that is player j believes that on average, every
other player will answer the math question 90% of the time. Let the
mean of the distribution of P1r=.9, that is player j believes that on
average, every other player will answer the math question correctly 90%

of the time when they choose to answer (i.e., they judge the problem to
be easy). Thus, Pp = .15. In our treatment, where y=$2, Vl=$l and
V2=$ 10, it follows from Equation 1 that P, < .2. Thus, player j must
think he has less than a 20% chance of getting the answer right (even
though the problem is judged by player j to be easy), while everyone else
has a 90% chance of getting the answer right. If these beliefs are true,
simultaneously, then player j must also believe that the probability that
she was drawn from the same distribution as the other nine players is
less than .00000001. For everyone to acquire information, as is desired
in the literature on deliberation, then everyone must believe they are
dumb (have only a 20% chance of getting the problem right) while
everyone else is smart (they have a 90% chance of getting the problem
right), and moreover they must believe everyone believes this about
them, so that while they think they are dumb, they think everyone else
thinks they are smart. This would seem to be a very odd set of beliefs to
hold.
We are thus left with the second type of beliefs that could support an
equilibrium in which everyone who needs information pays to receive it.
In this set of beliefs, everyone believes that they are unable to answer the
question without help, and they believe that everyone else is the same
and that everyone else believes this about everyone else. This set of
beliefs is unsupportable as well, for if it is true, then no one will step
forward to send information about the correct answer to the problem,
and everyone will pay to receive information that, in fact, was never
sent. Thus, these beliefs also seem unsupportable, and, in equilibrium,
no one should choose to pay to receive information.

